Lexical innovation and the periphery of language by Gasparri, Luca
Lexical Innovation and the Periphery of Language
Luca Gasparri | October 2020
Penultimate draft, final version to appear in Linguistics and Philosophy
Abstract
Lexical innovations (e.g., zero-derivations coined on the fly by a speaker) seem to bear semantic content. Yet, such
expressions cannot bear semantic content as a function of the conventions of meaning in force in the language, since
they are not part of its lexicon. This is in tension with the commonplace view that the semantic content of lexical
expressions is constituted by linguistic conventions. The conventionalist has two immediate ways out of the tension.
The first is to preserve the conventionalist assumption and deny that lexical innovations bear semantic content. The
second is  to  dynamicize the conventionalist  assumption,  that  is,  argue that  presentations of  unattested expressions
trigger an augmentation of the standing semantic resources of the language and instantiate content as a result of this
underlying update. Building on a comparison with the production of novel onomatopoeic words, iconic pseudowords
and pro-speech gestures, the paper argues that the issue is best addressed by suspending the conventionalist assumption,
and describes the metasemantic implications of the claim.
1. The Problem
Consider the following sentence.
1) [Context: the speaker is describing a basketball play]
John was fifteen feet from the basket and tried to shaq his way to the rim.
The word “shaq” is a novel zero-derivation created by turning the proper name ‘Shaq’, one of the
several nicknames of NBA superstar Shaquille O’Neal, into a verb.1 Even with no prior exposure to
the novel verb, basketball aficionados can recover the meaning of (1) quite easily: John established
a low post position and attempted to exploit his physical force to bump the defender, approach the
rim,  and  score.  Practically  speaking,  the  interpretation  of  “shaq”(1) is  thus  a  simple  task  to
accomplish, provided the example is presented to a rational listener with the relevant background
knowledge of the game of basketball, and of how Shaquille O’Neal used to play it.
1 I am not aware of previous uses of this verbification, and apologies if  anyone else should be credited for the
invention. That said, I can reasonably predict that most readers will be encountering the word for the first time.
Also, notational caveat: from now on, I will use expressions of form wordCL to notate vocabulary items and their
grammatical class, and expressions of form “word”S to notate lexical occurrences or presentations of words within
sentences.  Accordingly,  I  will  use  ShaqN and  shaqV to  refer  to  the  proper  name  ‘Shaq’ and  the  verb  ‘shaq’,
respectively, and “shaq”(1) to refer to the unfamiliar presentation featuring in (1). This toy notation is not completely
unambiguous, but will do the job for the purposes of this paper.
1
Theoretically speaking, however, examples like (1) raise a few questions. Some such questions
pertain to cognitive processing. Borrowing from the jargon of machine learning, examples like (1)
call for an account of the psychological mechanisms underlying “zero-shot” lexical interpretation in
humans.2 But  they  also  raise  foundational  questions,  as  they  generate  a  tension  between  two
independently plausible and widely endorsed assumptions about the nature of linguistic meaning
(see, e.g., the essays in Szabó (2005), Burgess and Sherman (2014), and Ball and Rabern (2018)).
Call these assumptions, for brevity, Semanticity and L-Conventionalism.
Semanticity The semantic content instantiated by presentations of well-formed,
felicitous sentences is jointly constituted by the semantic content of
their word-level parts.
L-Conventionalism The  semantic  content  of  word-level  sentential  constituents  is  a
function of the standing lexical conventions of the language.
Semanticity encapsulates the idea that the semantic content instantiated by presentations of
well-formed, felicitous natural language sentences results  from the combination of the semantic
contents of their lexical constituents. By “semantic content” I mean, and will consistently mean
throughout  the  paper,  the  general  province  of  semantic  facts  captured  by  the  corresponding
Kaplanian (1989) notion of “content”. Note that the principle refers to “presentations” of sentences.
I  am using this  amphibious  notion  for  two reasons.  First,  it  does  the  job of  signaling that  the
principle is making a claim about sentences-in-use rather than a claim about the standing properties
of sentence and expression types.3 Second, it does so while allowing Semanticity to remain neutral
on  the  competition  between  views  on which  the  proper  bearers  of  semantic  content  are  token
utterances, and views on which the proper bearers of content are sentence and expression types
themselves  qua relativized to a context of utterance: my argument should be intelligible for both
positions and won’t hinge on taking any particular side in this dispute. Note also the conjunction of
2 In machine learning (esp. computer vision), “zero-shot learning” refers to the processes by which a machine learns
to recognize objects in an image without any labeled training data to help in the classification. Approximating a bit,
“zero-shot learning” deals thus with the problem of building machines capable of emulating human-level abilities in
the classification of objects belonging to a class they have never encountered before (Xian et al. 2018). Since the
interpretation of “shaq”(1) can be characterized as a “zero-shot” task in this sense, I will borrow the label as a quick
reminder  to  the  fact  that  in  cases  such  as  (1)  listeners  are  faced  with  the  task  of  interpreting  the  inaugural
presentation of a word which is not part of the lexicon of the language.
3 In what follows, I will sometimes omit this qualification for concision’s sake.
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“well-formed” and “felicitous” in  the principle,  which provisionally understands grammaticality
and felicity as necessary conditions for a sentential presentation to instantiate a semantic content
jointly constituted by the content of its word-level parts. This is to account for the intuition that
syntactic  ill-formedness  (see  (2))  and  deficiencies  in  semantic  consistency  (e.g.,  the  category
mistake in  (3))  typically  prevent  lexical  semantic  contents  to  coherently combine into a  global
sentential content.
2) * The parked car Paula.
3) # Paula drank the car.
With these clarifications in sight, the business of Semanticity is straightforward enough: to assert
that  the  semantic  content  instantiated  by  presentations  of  sentences  complying  with  familiar
requirements of well-formedness and felicity, is a function of the semantic contents of their lexical
parts. For example, the semantic content of presentations of (4) should be a function of the contents
of “Paula”(4), “parked”(4), “the”(4), and “car”(4).
4) Paula parked the car.
L-Conventionalism,  then,  adds that  the  semantic  content  instantiated  by  presentations  of
lexical elements, and the way these contribute via composition to the global content of their host
sentences, is determined by the character-level or “standing” lexical conventions of the language.
For example, in English the lexical element  IPro is associated by convention to a character which
ensures  that  non-quotational  presentations  of  the  pronoun  will  pick  out the  speaker  that  has
produced  them.  Likewise,  in  English  the  word  eatV is  associated  by  convention  to  a  standing
semantic profile whose thematic properties prevent presentations of (5) from bearing the content
that Rebecca wants to eat a pleasant location.
5) Rebecca wants to eat someplace nice.
Note that L-Conventionalism encapsulates a particularized incarnation of the overarching belief in
the “conventional nature” of linguistic meaning (e.g., Lewis 1969). It concerns a specific level of
linguistic meaning, i.e., semantic content, and a specific variety of conventions, i.e., the specialized
conventions  of  semantic  character we  would  expect  to  be  part  of  the  lexical  component  of  a
linguistic grammar. The claim is that the semantic content instantiated by presentations of word-
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level expressions rests on these specialized linguistic conventions, and that presentations of lexical
units  instantiate  semantic  content  as  a  function  of  these  character-level  conventions.  To  avoid
confusion,  note also that L-Conventionalism is not trying to claim that conventions of standing
word meaning are the  only thing lexical semantic content is a function of: it merely asserts that
conventions  of  standing word meaning are going to  feature among the resources  that,  possibly
together with other factors (e.g., general worldly facts and features of the  non-linguistic context),
endow presentations of lexical expressions with semantic content.4 Furthermore, in committing to
the  dependence  of  semantic content  on  specialized conventions  of  linguistic  character,  L-
Conventionalism remains agnostic on the role of non-linguistic conventions in the constitution of
non-semantic meaning, such as the role of social conventions in the recovery of speaker-meaning or
pragmatically enriched utterance meaning. L-Conventionalism is not the claim that conventions of
linguistic character suffice to account for each and every aspect of communication, nor is it the
claim that understanding the contextual meaning of the utterances we hear doesn’t typically involve
reasoning and inference-making taking place outside the grammar.5 It is, rather, the more specific
claim that  the  semantic  content  and the  compositional  features  instantiated  by  presentations  of
word-level expressions is mediated by the  specialized body of linguistic conventions fixed in the
lexical system of the language.
Now, the  conjunction of  Semanticity  and L-Conventionalism is  unproblematic  if  measured
against presentations of sentences containing familiar words. Take (6).
6) Many students eat apples.
Semanticity argues that the semantic content of (6) should be constituted by the semantic contents
of  “many”(6),  “students”(6),  “eat”(6),  and  “apples”(6).  L-Conventionalism  adds  that  the  semantic
content  of  “many”(6),  “students”(6),  “eat”(6),  and “apples”(6) should  be a  function  of  the  standing
4 The exact scope of the set of supplementary factors that intervene in the determination of semantic content will, of
course, vary depending on the theory of meaning one is assuming. A minimalist à la Borg (2004), a contextualist à
la Recanati (2010), and a relativist à la MacFarlane (2014), are likely to endorse substantially different accounts of
what  formal  processes  and  what  resources,  besides  the  conventions  of  the  language,  endow  sentences  and
expressions with content. However, the matter is orthogonal to the specific claims made by L-Conventionalism and
Semanticity, versions of which I take to be widely shared among parties to the debate on the nature of meaning. I’m
making this explicit to stress that the two principles, and the tension between them we will consider in a moment,
are not the outcome of partisan metasemantic premises, and should make sense across the spectrum of theories of
meaning available on the philosophical market. 
5 See, e.g., Gasparri and Murez (2019). Back to this in due course.
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semantic features associated by convention to manyD, studentN, eatV, appleN,, and the plural suffix -s
in the lexicon of English. So far, so good. However, recall (1) and John’s attempt to “shaq” his way
to  the  basket.  On  Semanticity,  (1)  should  instantiate  a  semantic  content  resulting  from  the
combination of the content of its lexical parts. L-Conventionalism adds that the lexical parts of (1)
should instantiate semantic content relative to the lexical conventions of English. The problem is:
shaqV is  not  in  the  lexicon of  English.  As a  consequence,  Semanticity  and L-Conventionalism
cannot be embraced simultaneously in the analysis of (1). Either the semantic content borne by (1)
is constituted by the semantic content of “shaq”(1), as per Semanticity, and the case speaks against L-
Conventionalism.  Or,  because  shaqV is  not  part  of  English,  and  assuming  L-Conventionalism,
“shaq”(1) does not bear semantic content, and (1) is a counterexample to Semanticity.
We can provide a generalized formulation of the problem. Assume, with Semanticity, that well-
formed,  felicitous  sentences  instantiate  a  semantic  content  jointly  constituted  by  the  semantic
contents  of  their  lexical  parts.  Assume  also,  with  L-Conventionalism,  that  the  instantiation  of
semantic  content  by  word-level  expressions  is  a  function  of  the  standing  semantic  features
associated by convention to those expressions in the lexicon of the language. The combination of
these two assumptions is typically straightforward, but runs into troubles as soon as it is projected
onto presentations of well-formed, felicitous sentences featuring lexical innovations.6 Either lexical
innovations  bear  semantic  content  and,  by  falling  outside  the  conventional  resources  of  the
language, provide counterevidence to the conditions for the instantiation of semantic content set by
L-Conventionalism.  Or  L-Conventionalism  sets  a  genuine  requirement  for  the  instantiation  of
semantic content, and we should reconsider the claim that presentations of unattested words may
bear full-blooded semantic content.
This paper has two goals: a programmatic goal and a substantive one. The programmatic goal is
to  interface  the  philosophical  discussion  on  meaning  and  conventions  with  recent  advances  in
linguistic  theory on the semantics of “peripheral” devices of communication like iconic words,
iconic pseudowords and gestures (e.g., Kendon 2004; Lascarides and Stone 2009; Ebert and Ebert
2014; Schlenker 2018; 2019), and suggest that a combined investigation of these apparently distant
domains can lead to fruitful insights into the foundations of meaning and semantic properties. The
substantive goal is to use the parallel to argue for a non-conventionalist diagnosis of the tension
between Semanticity and L-Conventionalism.
6 Throughout the paper, I will use labels such as “lexical innovations”, “novel expressions”, and “unattested words”
almost interchangeably, but always to designate presentations of expressions which are not part of the lexicon of the
language. Labels like “lexical innovation” are ambiguous between (at least) two readings: one referring to the use
of brand new expressions (like “shaq”(1)), and one referring to semantically unfamiliar or deviant uses of attested
expressions. These are distinct objects of analysis, and this paper is about the former. 
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The plan is as follows. Section 2 describes the view that the presentations of lexical innovations
like “shaq”(1) trigger an implicit update of the lexical conventions of the language, which in turn
allows the unfamiliar word to instantiate semantic content. Section 3 draws a parallel between (1)
and sentences featuring presentations of novel onomatopoeic words, iconic pseudowords, and pro-
speech gestures, and uses the comparison to argue that the dynamic-conventionalist view suffers
from difficulties. Section 4 presents an alternative: the view that lexical innovations motivate a
metasemantics licensing the instantiation of semantic content without the mediation of the standing
semantic resources of the language. Section 5 recapitulates and makes some concluding remarks.
2. Dynamic Conventions
Armstrong (2016) provides a nice formulation of the challenges that conventionalist approaches to
meaning encounter faced with examples featuring, like (1), presentations of unattested expressions.7
Borrowing from his  argument,  the  conventionalist has two immediate  ways  out  of  the  tension
between Semanticity and L-Conventionalism.
The  first way  out  is  to  keep  the  current  formulation  of  L-Conventionalism  and  give  up
Semanticity. Since L-Conventionalism dictates that lexical semantic content is a function of the
standing lexical resources of the language, and since no shaqV is found in the lexicon of English, we
should withdraw from the  premise that  “shaq”(1) may bear  full-blooded semantic  content.  Pace
Semanticity, which would predict that the semantic content of (1) should be participated in by the
semantic content of “shaq”(1), the presentation is semantically gappy at the position occupied by the
zero-derivation,  and  “shaq”(1) makes  no  compositional  contribution  to  the  content  of  its  host
sentence.  If  anything, it  can only contribute to  the communicated or “inferred” meaning of (1)
thanks to general pragmatic and conversational principles.
As Armstrong (2016: 95-96) himself observes, this option does not seem particularly attractive.
To start,  the sentence dos not trigger the judgments of ungrammaticality or infelicity we would
expect if the presentation suffered from a genuine semantic deficiency. Another issue is that in the
absence of semantic content, it is unclear on the basis of what kind of pragmatic or conversational
principles “shaq”(1) might yield communicated meaning, since the usual story is that pragmatically
determined  word  meanings  require  the  prior  availability  of  a  semantic  input  to  inferential
comprehension.  Third,  and  perhaps  more  importantly,  even  on  first  exposure  the  novel  zero-
7 Among the examples he considers: “Bea managed to houdini her way out of her cell”; “A local resident expressed
concern that incoming developers were going to  east village her neighborhood in Brooklyn”; “The delivery boy
managed to  porch the newspaper at every house on the block”; “Pat made sure to  whisky the punch before the
teachers arrived”. In what follows, I will keep relying on (1) as my central case study, but the rest of the argument
would apply equally well to any of these other examples.
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derivation word appears to be structurally integrated to the rest of the sentence, which would be
hard to explain without the instantiation of compositionally efficacious content. The point can be
appreciated  by  considering  variants  of  (1)  where  the  zero-derivation  successfully  occurs  under
negation or under a modal verb. See (7) and (8).
7) John did not shaq his way to the rim.
8) You couldn’t shaq to the hoop if you weren’t a big man.
Likewise,  borrowing from the classic  tests  for  telicity  (Dowty 1979),  the novel  zero-derivation
seems to immediately rule out the combination of perfective form and interval adverbials. Compare
(9) to (10).
9) John shaqqed to the hoop for an hour.
10) John shaqqed to the hoop in an hour.
Taken together, these observations make a plausible case that we are best advised looking for a
solution that maintains the premise that “shaq”(1) makes a genuine semantic contribution to (1).
The second way out is to keep Semanticity and revise the formulation of L-Conventionalism in
such a way as to make it neutralize the tension.8 On this view, “shaq”(1) does bear semantic content,
and the correct diagnosis of the tension is that we should render L-Conventionalism more flexible.
The reasoning is the following. Cases like (1) challenge the doctrine of L-Conventionalism only if
the specialized body of conventions of character governing the instantiation of semantic content is
understood as a  static inventory. But that seems an unlikely assumption. The arsenal of semantic
conventions in force in a language is adaptive, ever changing; when the right conditions are in
place, it can evolve abruptly, if not instantaneously (think of baptisms). The observation suggests a
surprisingly simple solution to the tension generated by (1): drop the assumption that the semantic
content of a lexical innovation like “shaq”(1) can be constituted only by the conventions of semantic
8 A reviewer points out that another  solution would be to assume that “shaq”(1) is a code for a definite description
built with attested lexical material, something like “John tried to do the kind of thing Shaq usually does”, and that
“shaq”(1) inherits its content from definite description it replaces. This is certainly a possibility, but the move raises
some questions.  What  non-ad hoc motivations  do  we have  to  believe  that  “shaq”(1) is  a  proxy for  a  definite
description? What would be the exact format of the description involved, and how would it fit into the original
structure of (1) (“John was fifteen feet from the basket and tried to do the kind of thing Shaq usually does [his way]
[?? to the rim]”)? Furthermore, while the move is available for (1), it does not appear to be an open option for some
of the instances of lexical innovation we will consider below. I therefore will not consider this possibility further. 
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meaning holding in the language prior to the presentation of (1). In other words, the lesson we
should learn from the tension is not that we should suspend Semanticity, but rather that examples
like (1) motivate a dynamic reinterpretation of L-Conventionalism. Call it, for brevity, Dynamic L-
Conventionalism. 
Dynamic L-Conventionalism The semantic content of word-level sentential constituents is a
function  of  the  standing  lexical  conventions  holding  or
established on the fly in the language.
Dynamic L-Conventionalism appears broadly plausible. There certainly are attractive features
to the idea that following even a single instance of successful coordination on the meaning of an
unattested word, the participants to a conversation can establish a semantic convention for the novel
term and, e.g., expect that the conversational participants will assign subsequent presentations of the
expression content consistent with this background convention. In general, this revised formulation
promises  to  improve  dramatically  on  its  static  parent  when  it  comes  to  giving  a  promising
convention-based explanation of the dynamics of general language change (Bybee 2015), lexical
change (e.g., Ludlow 2014), or metalinguistic negotiation (Plunkett and Sundell 2013). The thesis
also reconciles,  at  least  in intent,  familiar  Davidsonian objections to conventionalist  theories of
meaning  (see  Davidson  1984;  1986;  1991)  with  the  received  picture  that  communication  is
essentially a matter of shared linguistic conventions.9 If viable, Dynamic L-Conventionalism would
give us an ideal result: it would allow us to preserve Semanticity, maintain a role for specialized
linguistic conventions in accounting for the semantic properties of lexical innovations, and restore
the  lost  harmony  between  our  assumptions  at  the  cost  of  a  minimal  revision  to  the  original
formulation of L-Conventionalism.
However, how successful really is Dynamic L-Conventionalism? First of all, we need to be
clear on an issue of scope: whether or not the principle should be expected to capture, besides the
dynamics occurring after the zero-shot episode of interpretive coordination on an unattested term,
also the dynamics underlying the emergence of semantic content at the inaugural presentation of a
9 It might be worth recalling that for Davidson malapropisms and cases of accidental mispronunciations were as 
challenging for a conventionalist theory of meaning as cases like (1). Yet, the generalization is debatable. For 
example, Predelli (2010) and Lepore and Stone (2017) argue that malapropisms (e.g., “The police apprehended two 
auspicious individuals”) can be reconciled with assumptions in the same ballpark as L-Conventionalism by 
hypothesizing that the sentence actually presented in such cases is the one featuring the word the speaker attempted 
to articulate (i.e., “The police apprehended two suspicious individuals”), and that the utterance inherits the 
conventional semantic features of the sentence it was intended to externalize. Cf. Armstrong (2016: fn. 17).
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sentence like (1). We can, accordingly, distinguish two readings of the principle: a “weak” reading
and  a  “literal”  reading.  The  weak  option  is  to  evaluate  Dynamic  L-Conventionalism  under  a
restriction excluding the inaugural instantiation of semantic content from the explanatory scope of
the principle. In this case, Dynamic L-Conventionalism would be a claim about presentations of
unfamiliar terms that have at least one salient lexical precedent. The literal option is to take the
formulation of Dynamic L-Conventionalism at face value: since the principle is trying to tell us
something about the “semantic content of word-level sentential  constituents”,  and “shaq” (1) is a
word-level  sentential  constituent,  the  principle  should  provide  explanatory  purchase  on  the
inaugural presentation of (1). On this reading, the success of Dynamic L-Conventionalism hinges
on its ability to capture the emergence of lexical semantic content both after and at the event of the
inaugural presentation of a lexical innovation like “shaq”(1).  Importantly, only the literal reading
commits to the notion that Dynamic L-Conventionalism should be retracted if the instantiation of
semantic content by the inaugural presentation of “shaq”(1) cannot be explained in conventionalist
terms. On the weak reading, by contrast, no such implication is drawn: proof that the instantiation
of semantic content by the inaugural presentation of “shaq”(1) is not amenable to the conventionalist
account would pose no harm to Dynamic L-Conventionalism.
In what follows, I will focus on the literal reading of Dynamic L-Conventionalism. The choice
has a simple reason: only the literal construal of Dynamic L-Conventionalism stands a chance of
truly neutralizing the tension with Semanticity. If the premise that the inaugural presentation of
“shaq”(1) bears semantic content is correct, the tension with L-Conventionalism cannot be resolved
merely by insisting that linguistic conventions can be established sometimes very quickly after an
initial episode of coordination on the meaning of an unattested term. Plausible as this might be,
even if the zero-shot coordination on the meaning of “shaq”(1) did contribute to the rapid emergence
of a convention generating semantic content for non-inaugural presentations of the unfamiliar term,
the semantic properties instantiated by that inaugural presentation would still be a negative instance
to the principle, and recreate the original tension.10 In other words, we cannot consider Dynamic L-
Conventionalism a formally adequate answer to our problem unless we are serious about the idea
that the principle manages to carve out a space for specialized linguistic conventions in the factors
that determine semantic content for the first presentation of a lexical innovation.
10 For example, Armstrong’s (2016) argument that a dynamic approach can preserve a role for linguistic conventions
in accounting for the semantic properties of lexical innovations, seems to be an argument in favor of what I have
called “weak Dynamic L-Conventionalism”. Proof that weak Dynamic L-Conventionalism is viable would be of
consequence, and Armstrong does a remarkable job of showing the interest and the explanatory virtues of the view.
However, if I am correct, the less ambitious reading of Dynamic L-Conventionalism would not settle the specific
tension between Semanticity and L-Conventionalism we are considering.
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So let us focus on literal Dynamic L-Conventionalism. Once Semanticity and literal Dynamic
L-Conventionalism are combined, the zero-shot presentation of (1) entails what follows.
Lexical Adaptation
i. The speaker produces (1) and “shaq”(1) is inaugurally presented.
ii. The presentation of “shaq”(1) feeds the language with a novel proto-convention fixing
the standing meaning of shaqV.
iii. “shaq”(1) bears semantic content as a function of the standing features of shaqV.
Before  we  dig  into  the  prospects  of  Lexical  Adaptation,  three  clarifications.  The  first
clarification is that, as it stands, Lexical Adaptation is conditional on an orthodox metasemantics on
which sentence  and expression types  bear  speaker-insensitive  standing properties,  rather  than  a
framework on which the actual subject matter of semantic theorizing is the idiolect of individual
speakers.  Inquiry  into  whether  the  zero-shot  presentation  of  “shaq”(1) suffices  by  itself,  as  the
combination of Semanticity and literal Dynamic L-Conventionalism suggests, to determine facts
about the conventional standing features of the lexical item  shaqV (facts that, of course, may be
altered due to subsequent negotiation by the linguistic community) presupposes that expression
types are (or can be) associated to standing semantic properties which hold, and bear normative
force,  irrespective of their appreciation by the individual speakers.  I will grant this assumption.
Though I expect a suitably modified variant of my argument to hold even under the premise of an
idiolect-centered metasemantics,11 keep in mind that much of what I am going to be saying makes
immediate sense only through the lenses of the opposite hypothesis.12
The second clarification is that although I have appealed and will appeal, for convenience, to
the notion that the linguistic conventions fixing the standing properties of lexical items are part of
the “lexicon”, Lexical Adaptation is not necessarily committed to a formal grammar featuring an
autonomous lexical component. The claim is simply that zero-shot “shaq”(1) bears semantic content
because its presentation amounts to the proposition of an “augmented” variant of English assigning
shaqV conventional  semantic  features.  The assessment  of  this  claim should  be  meaningful  and
coherent  both  for  theories  on which  lexical  conventions  are  the  centerpiece  of  an autonomous
lexicon, and for frameworks on which these resources are spread across other components of the
11 Which many fear is inevitably going to suffer from major drawbacks: among others, it will flirt with a controversial
form of Humpty Dumptyism, and will have a hard time making sense of how speakers may be ignorant or confused
about the semantic properties of the expressions of their language (e.g., Barber 2001). 
12 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this.
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grammar,  such as  the syntax-all-the-way-down approach of  Distributed Morphology (Halle  and
Marantz 1993; 1994) or psychological models à la Elman (2009).
The third clarification is  about  a  point  which is  implicit  to  the setup of  the argument,  but
nonetheless  worth  insisting  upon.  It  concerns  the  explanatory  niche  of  our  discussion  and  its
encapsulation from neighboring debates in philosophy of language and linguistics. The question we
are  after  has  essentially  to  do  with  the  mechanisms allowing  lexical  innovations  to  instantiate
compositionally efficacious content irrespective of the absence of relevant conventions of meaning.
The subject has multiple connections with topics like the nature of linguistic understanding and the
dynamics of communicative success and coordination (both in general and in cases featuring lexical
innovations). Yet, it remains fundamentally distinct from them. Our focus is not on the nature of the
interpretive mechanisms triggered in interpreters upon exposure to a sentence like (1); nor is it a
clarification  of  the  conditions  that  have  to  obtain  to  justifiably  claim  that  the  listener  “has
understood (1)”, or that speaker and listener have achieved “communicative coordination” on the
meaning of (1) (all questions contingent on the settling of antecedent controversies about the nature
of “understanding” and “communicative coordination”). Our focus is on the factors in virtue of
which inaugural presentations of unattested words such as the novel zero-derivation of (1) may
instantiate semantic content, and on whether these factors, as posited by Lexical Adaptation, have to
contemplate an underlying change in state of the lexical resources of the language. To put it a bit
crudely,  this  is  “metaphysics  of  meaning”,  not  an  armchair  reconstruction  of  the  functional
architecture of language processing, nor an inquiry into the epistemology of communication. It does
not deal with how speakers do or should come to an appreciation of semantic content faced with the
task  of  interpreting  (1),  but  with  the  grounds  in  virtue  of  which  presentations  of  (1)  bear  the
semantic properties they bear in the first place.13
Back to  Lexical  Adaptation.  If  you believe  that  a  foundational  theory  of  semantic  content
should ultimately be cashed out in conventionalist terms, Lexical Adaptation appears a very good
way of meeting the challenge presented by (1).  Treating presentations of lexical innovations as
updates to the standing resources of the language seems to give us a framework where the evidence
in  favor  of  Semanticity  and  the  metasemantic  program  of  L-Conventionalism  can  join  forces
without any either-or lurking in the background.  Notwithstanding this attractive feature, I believe
there are reasons to cast doubt on the idea that Lexical Adaptation is the best way of approaching
the odd predicament cases like (1) put us in. Dynamic L-Conventionalism may well be correct on
the overarching point that linguistic conventions are flexible bodies, and that the lexical-semantic
apparatus of a language can be updated sometimes very rapidly by a community of speakers. Even
13 Thanks to two anonymous reviewers for inviting me to clarify this.
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so,  Lexical  Adaptation  is  probably  not  the  best  story  we  can  tell  about  how  the  inaugural
presentation  of  “shaq”(1),  despite  the  absence  of  shaqV in  the  lexicon,  might  comply  with
Semanticity. I will make my case for a different strategy. On the resulting proposal, the lesson we
should draw from (1) is not that we should buy into the marriage of Semanticity and Dynamic L-
Conventionalism giving rise to Lexical Adaptation, but that we should loosen the stricture on the
admissible  grounds  of  semantic  content  set  by  L-Conventionalism,  and  drastically  relax  our
metasemantics in anti-conventionalist direction.
3. Widening the Landscape
Let us start with two observations. The first observation, actually a programmatic reminder, is that a
meaningful analysis of the tension surfacing from (1) should not lose sight of the richness and the
productivity of the lexicon. It is widely accepted that lexical entries are informationally complex
entities which impose various requirements on the structures in which they find themselves. Think
of argument structure and of the distributional phenomena grouped under the notions of S-selection
and  C-selection  in  textbook  linguistic  theory  (e.g.,  Fromkin  2000).  But  most  importantly,  the
lexicon  is  a  generative  engine  (a.o.,  Bauer  2001;  Jackendoff  2002),  and  conventions  of  word
meaning can be generated compositionally (Higginbotham 1986; Larson and Segal 1995). Suppose
English* is an impoverished duplicate of English whose lexicon contains an entry for the prefix
out-, an entry for the verb populate, and the inflectional suffix -s, but does not feature an entry for
outpopulateV. Suppose also a speaker of English* encounters for the first time the sentence “India
outpopulates Japan”.  Even in the absence of an entry specifying the conventional properties of
outpopulateV in English*, the lexical resources available to the speaker of English* will be perfectly
sufficient to determine that the sentence features a complex inflected verb made of three familiar
constituents (the prefix out-, a root borrowed from populate, the inflectional suffix -s), combine the
semantic features of these constituents, and generate semantic content for the unfamiliar word. To
be sure, these generative mechanisms do not help account for cases of word coinage involving
semantically “primitive” lexical innovations which, like “shaq”(1), cannot be analyzed as the child of
conventionalized  lexical  parents,  and  are  not  generated  via  mechanisms  that  ensure  semantic
productivity. That said, keep in mind that the lexicon is considerably more productive than a mere
list of conventional form-to-denotation pairs.
The second, more at-issue observation can be initially stated as follows. Assume Semanticity:
“shaq”(1) instantiates semantic content and (1) is not semantically gappy at the position occupied by
the  novel  zero-derivation.  Now,  the  idea  that  the  presentation  of  (1)  entails  an  underlying
augmentation of the lexical resources of English does offer a formally consistent picture of the
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grounds of (1)’s content, and does reconcile Semanticity with L-Conventionalism. But it does so at
the cost of a rather cumbersome explanatory epicycle. To understand the point, consider what a
listener might plausibly be required to do to interpret (1) on first exposure. Once the grammatical
class and the inflectional characteristics of “shaq”(1) have been identified, and once the interpretive
system has isolated the bits of information that are relevant to produce a hypothesis about the action
designated by “shaq”(1), why would a listener need to update their lexicon with an entry for shaqV to
fill  the  semantic  content  of  the  sentence,  instead  of  using  this  “grab-bag”  (Rayo  2013)  of
information directly to formulate a hypothesis about content? While it is hard to think of the zero-
shot interpretation of (1) without contemplating, at some stage, the inspection of the body of factual
knowledge possessed by the listener about the style of play of Shaquille O’Neal,14 the mediation of
a proto-convention of meaning for shaqV seems inessential to an explanation of how a listener might
have epistemic access to “shaq”(1)’s content. Psychologistic concerns aside, Lexical Adaptation does
offer a handy way of generalizing the baseline story set  by L-Conventionalism to the realm of
sentences featuring novel words. But at this point we cannot take it as antecedently evident that our
way out of the tension should be a chapter of L-Conventionalism, especially if, to remain within the
standard doctrine,  we  have  to  buy  into  the  somewhat  mysterious  narrative  that  the  inaugural
utterance of  “shaq”(1) magically enriches the language with the semantic resources required to make
its content a function from a Kaplan-style character. Parsimony would probably suggest a different
diagnosis. The question, thus, is whether there are independent reasons to believe that the content
instantiated by the zero-shot presentation of “shaq”(1) should be mediated by the augmentation in
lexical resources posited by Lexical Adaptation.
Suppose one insists that these independent reasons have to do with the productive role that the
morphology plays in the generation of the novel zero-derivation. After all, “shaq”(1) is a presentation
of the verbal counterpart of a known vocabulary item (ShaqN), and switching grammatical class
while keeping word form constant is a function which takes in a lexical entry and outputs another
lexical entry. Once, the rejoinder might continue, we accept the seemingly uncontroversial premise
that “shaq”(1) is the occurrence of a verb derived from a preexisting name though a process of
change in  grammatical  class,  it  stands  to  reason to  think that  the  zero-shot  presentation  of  (1)
requires the prior enrichment of the lexicon with an entry for shaqV via morphological conversion,
14 As a matter of fact, cooperative lexical innovation tends to rely on an implicit theory of the informational resources
required to interpret the unattested word, and on an assumption that such resources are available to the listener. For
example, the production of (1) is likely to occur modulo a tacit belief that the addressee is familiar with Shaquille
O’Neal and associates him to the properties that are relevant to the interpretation of “shaq” (1) (being physically
imposing and bumping defenders under the rim) in an almost stereotypical fashion.
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and that the standing semantic features associated on the fly to this lexical entry fix in turn the
semantic content of the unfamiliar occurrence.
My reply  comes  in  two steps.  The  first step  is  to  note  that  even  if  we granted  that  the
morphological rejoinder is effective for (1), it faces an issue of generality. Lexical Adaptation is
supposed to  give us a  general model  of how unfamiliar  words might be able to bear  semantic
content despite the absence of lexical resources specifying their conventional interpretation in the
language. However, words coined on the basis of morphological conversion are just one instance of
lexical innovation, and the rejoinder does not extend to cases where the novel word is not generated
based on familiar lexical material. Lexical innovations that have no vocabulary-level parent and are
introduced  by  inference  on  properties  in  the  domain  of  sensory  cognition,  such  as  novel
onomatopoeic verbs, offer an especially instructive comparison. Consider (11).
11) Mary saw the girls jump on their motorbikes and schwoom through the alley.
Listeners exposed for the first time to (11) appear able to identify a strong candidate meaning for
the novel verb simply by analyzing its observable form and the sentential environment where it
occurs.  Suppose  we  grant  Semanticity:  the  sentence  is  felicitous  and  well-formed,  and
“schwoom”(11) bears semantic content. What grounds the instantiation of semantic content in this
case? Lexical Adaptation would answer that the ground is given by the underlying augmentation in
lexical resources of the language entailed by the very act of presenting (11). Again, this story seems
unnecessarily complex: it is unclear why one should ground the instantiation of semantic content on
an  underlying  change in  state  of  the  standing resources  of  the  language  when facts  about  the
linguistic environment of the word, its morphosyntactic features, and its observable form combined
are perfectly adequate to do the job. But unlike (1), the introduction of the new verb of (11) does not
rely on the conversion of any preexisting lexical material, so the augmentation in lexical resources
posited  by  Lexical  Adaptation  cannot,  in  this  case,  be  justified  on  the  basis  of  morphological
considerations of the kind we have contemplated for (1).
The second step of the reply is to note that morphosyntactic considerations are unlikely to lend
support to Lexical Adaptation irrespective of the specifics of cases like (1) and (11). Suppose we
grant that since the presentation of “shaq”(1) involves morphological conversion, the production of
(1) requires the prior enrichment of the lexicon with an entry for shaqV. Suppose also we grant that
while this reasoning is unavailable in the case of  (11), the observation that  in the presentation of
(11) “schwoom”(11) bears the syntactic features of an infinitive is everything we need to justify the
prior enrichment of the grammar with schwoomV, since an infinitive form has to be generated from
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some root lexical entry. However, there is a difference between claiming that the morphosyntactic
content instantiated by “shaq”(1) and “schwoom”(11) requires the presence in the lexicon of the root
entries shaqV and schwoomV, and the claim that the semantic content of “shaq”(1) and “schwoom”(11)
is a function of the standing semantic features associated to those root entries. The fact that the
production  of  “shaq”(1) involves  morphological  conversion  and  that  “schwoom”(11) bears
morphosyntactic  content,  might  as  well  require  the  prior  transition  to  a  grammar  featuring the
entries schwoomV and shaqV. But this is no guarantee that in the process these entries will also be
associated with standing semantic features yielding content for “shaq”(1) and “schwoom”(11). In other
words, even if we grant that the morphosyntactic content of “shaq”(1) and “schwoom”(11) has to be a
function of the standing morphosyntactic features of shaqV and schwoomV, this is no evidence that
the  semantic content of the presentations  is a function of the character-level semantic features of
those two entries. A more  parsimonious diagnosis would  take “shaq”(1) and “schwoom”(11) to be
generated relative  to  some proto-enrichment  of  the  lexical  system with  two entries,  shaqV and
schwoomV, which bear the standing features requires to fix the morphosyntactic content of the two
presentations, but are devoid of any character-level meaning, and therefore unfit to play any part in
the determination of their content. On this line of thinking, it would then be natural to contemplate
the hypothesis that the semantic content of “shaq”(1) and “schwoom”(11) is generated as a function of
factors sitting entirely outside the standing semantic resources of the language (e.g., in the case of
(11),  facts  about  observable  morphosyntactic  features  of  the  novel  presentation,  facts  about  its
sentential environment, and facts about the observable form of the occurrence). Bottom line: it is
still  unclear  why  the  content  instantiated  by  sentences  like  (11)  and  (1)  should  rest  on  the
underlying emergence of a convention of standing meaning for the respective lexical innovations.
Let us pause for a moment and reconsider the situation. At the beginning of our discussion, we
identified two immediate ways the conventionalist could iron out the tension between Semanticity
and  L-Conventionalism:  strip  “shaq”(1) of  semantic  content  and  retract  Semanticity,  or  allow
“shaq”(1) to get content relative to a tacit update in the body of conventions of standing meaning
holding in the language, as per literal Dynamic L-Conventionalism  cum Lexical Adaptation. We
have seen that the simple tests in (7)-(10) give credence to the hypothesis that “shaq” (1) does bear
semantic content, thus giving motivations to keep Semanticity in the picture. Now, the instantiation
of semantic content on behalf of a word-level part of a sentence normally requires the availability of
a convention of character in the language. Since full-blooded, compositionally efficacious semantic
content can only be determined relative to a convention of character, we have grounds to generalize
L-Conventionalism to lexical innovations and resolve the tension through the assumption of a rapid-
fire change in the arsenal of conventions of the language. This seems to be the critical juncture: if
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we bought into the notion that facts about semantic content and the compositional role of the lexical
parts  of a sentence can be entirely determined by facts  outside the semantic  component  of the
grammar, we would fall, so to speak, into metasemantic anarchy. We would except to the orderly
principle that presentations of an expression can bear full-blooded semantic content, and participate
in sentential composition, only if that expression is associated to standing semantic-compositional
features in the lexicon of the language (otherwise, it can serve at the best the purpose of conveying
communicated content). Making this exception is a costly move; that is why we should be happy to
revise  L-Conventionalism  and  add  the  epicycle  leading  to  Lexical  Adaptation,  despite  the
perplexities and the overall shadow of convolution the move seems to cast.
With all this in mind, consider (12) and (13).
12) Great. Now Mark’s mood will [iconic pseudoword: [u]-SOUND DESCENDING IN PITCH]..
13) Great.  Now  Mark’s  mood  will  [pro-speech  gesture: HAND WITH PALM UP +  ARM
DESCENDING DIAGONALLY].15
We mentioned that (11) cast doubt on Lexical Adaptation because it presented a case where, due to
the iconic properties of “schwoom”(11),  the instantiation of semantic content was likely to occur
without the mediation of the standing semantic resources of the language. This lent circumstantial
support to the hypothesis that (1)’s compliance with Semanticity could be captured through similar
means.  (12) and (13) present  a strengthened variant  of the same theoretical  predicament.  Once
again, the meaning of the pro-speech gesture and of the pseudoword are plausibly grounded on facts
outside the purview of the semantic conventions of English, due to their iconic nature. It seems
fairly natural to assume that the content they contribute to the sentences they are embedded in, is
generated directly by the combination of sentential context with the physical makeup of the sign,
rather than by some intermediate augmentation of the conventional resources of the language.16 The
15 Note on the terminology: pro-speech gestures are gestures that replace entire words. They are distinguished from
co-speech gestures, which are produced simultaneously with the spoken words they modify, and from post-speech
gestures, which follow the expressions they modify.
16 Since I am putting weight on the parallels between lexical innovations and novel iconic presentations, note that I
am not assuming, or trying to convince the reader, that the interpretation of iconic presentations has no place for
conventions. First of all, some iconic presentations are completely conventionalized and require the knowledge of
an explicit signaling convention to be successfully interpreted (another basketball analogy: think of the hand gesture
used  by  NBA officials  to  signal  a  travel  violation).  Other  iconic  presentations  rely  on  implicit or  natural
representational  conventions which subjects  can identify and  parse  even with no explicit  learning,  but  remain
“conventions” in the full sense of the term: think of Greenberg (2013) on the conventions of linear projection in
pictures, and Cumming, Greenberg and Kelly (2017) on the conventions of viewpoint coherence in film. However,
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additional peculiarity of these examples is the non-linguistic nature of  [u]-SOUND DESCENDING IN
PITCH(12) and HAND WITH PALM UP + ARM DESCENDING DIAGONALLY(13). While the instantiation of
semantic content by the innovation of (11) could, in principle, be made sense of through the idea of
an underlying change in state of the lexical resources of the language (the issue was that the move
seemed stipulative and could be ockhamized), Lexical Adaptation looks like a nonstarter when it
comes to capturing (12) and (13), since the pseudoword and the gesture and are not the kind of
signs that  can be registered as lexical  types  and be associated to  standing meaning by way of
linguistic convention. Yet, both the pseudoword and the gesture fit the label “word-level sentential
constituents” featuring in Dynamic L-Conventionalism; we would find them as terminal lexical
nodes in a representation of the syntactic structure of the respective sentences. If so, we obtain a
direct argument to deliver a negative verdict on Dynamic L-Conventionalism, and in turn conclude
that dynamic reformulation of L-Conventionalism does not help rescue the conventionalist principle
from the problem of lexical innovation.
I see three possible reactions to the pressure from (12) and (13). The first reaction would be to
neutralize the pressure by claiming that [u]-SOUND DESCENDING IN PITCH(12) and HAND WITH PALM
UP + ARM DESCENDING DIAGONALLY(13) are just codes for familiar words. On this view, [u]-SOUND
DESCENDING IN PITCH(12) and  HAND WITH PALM UP +  ARM DESCENDING DIAGONALLY(13) are just
presentations  of  the  phrases  “descend”  or  “drop  down”  under  an  atypical  guise,  and  their
contribution to the meaning of the respective sentences is determined by the conventional resources
of the grammar, consistent with the original formulation of L-Conventionalism.
This line of reasoning would effectively neutralize the pressure, but conflicts with evidence
that pro-speech gestures and iconic pseudowords convey gradient iconic information that cannot be
emulated with standard lexical items (Schlenker 2019). For example, the modulation of the angle
and the amplitude of the movement of the arm in (13) can be used to trigger fine-grained inferences
about the speed and the magnitude of the change in Mark’s mood (“Mark will  slowly go from
neutral  to  sad”  vs.  “Mark  will  rapidly  go  from euphoric  to  utterly  depressed”).  The  fact  that
modulations of this sort cannot be reproduced with standard lexical items militates quite strongly
as  we  have  repeatedly  made  clear,  the  issue  at  stake  here  is  the  relationship  between  semantic content  and
specialized conventions of semantic character, rather than the relationship between semantic content and “general”
conventions  of  meaning  (e.g.,  the  kind  of  non-linguistic  conventions  explored  by  recent  work  on  pictorial
representation). The issue whether or not the semantic content of presentations of unattested words is constituted by
an underlying augmentation of the body of specialized conventions holding in the language, is independent on
whether  their  content  is  also  (partly)  dependent  on  non-specialized  conventions  of  meaning  (e.g.,  in  (12),  a
conventional mapping from decreases in pitch to decreases in tone or affect). Willingness to grant the latter claim
would not settle the former. Thanks to two anonymous reviewers for helpful discussion on these points.
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against  the  idea  that  [u]-SOUND DESCENDING IN PITCH”(12) and  HAND WITH PALM UP +  ARM
DESCENDING DIAGONALLY(13) may  be  reduced  to  modes  of  non-phonological  externalization  of
“standard” lexical words.
The second reaction would be to accept the comparison but object to the notion that the non-
lexical nature of [u]-SOUND DESCENDING IN PITCH”(12) and HAND WITH PALM UP + ARM DESCENDING
DIAGONALLY(13) make them unsuited to be captured by Lexical Adaptation. What the comparison
shows, if anything, isn’t that the content instantiated by novel iconic pseudowords and pro-speech
gestures is a counterexample to Lexical Adaptation, but that we should consider an inclusive theory
on which the specialized conventions of semantic character  that  bear on our argument,  are  not
restricted by design to the conventions of “standard” lexical expressions. In other words, linguistic
conventions do not have to concern exclusively expressions bearing a phonographic form, but can
encompass also pseudowords and gestures, which, when the appropriate requirements are in place,
are to be regarded as a genuine lexical objects. As soon as this “accommodating” approach is taken
on board, the presentations of (12) and (13) become perfectly amenable to an explanation in terms
of Lexical  Adaptation:  they trigger  the transition to  a state  of the linguistic  grammar featuring
appropriate conventions of standing linguistic meaning for the gesture and the pseudoword, which
turn endow their presentations with semantic content.
Once again, we can grant that this rejoinder would neutralize the pressure. But skepticism
seems the most appropriate response to the move. There certainly is a “loose” sense in which we
can regard gestures and pseudowords as lexical entities, since in our everyday linguistic life we
regularly communicate by combining lexical production with gestural production and other forms
of non-linguistic  signaling.  (12)  and (13) wouldn’t  sound so natural  otherwise.  It  is  also fairly
evident that it is hard to impose principled restrictions on the kind of forms or shapes that can be
registered  in  the  lexical  system of  language  (think  of  languages  where  tone  is  a  semantically
contrastive  feature),  and  that  a  language  whose  lexicon  comprises,  e.g.,  gestural  elements  is
perfectly conceivable. However, this seems insufficient to justify the rejoinder in the specific case
of  (12)  and  (13).  Even  if  the  pseudoword  and  the  gesture  were  associated  to  a  conventional
semantic function, it seems safe to predict that that association would not be registered into the
specialized body of semantic conventions that sustains our knowledge of linguistic character. They
would end up into a separate non-linguistic inventory (e.g., a gestural lexicon) situated outside the
proper boundaries of the linguistic grammar. Absent a clear argument to the contrary, the force of
the comparison remains.
The third reaction would be to object to the consistency of the comparison. Precisely because
(1) and (11) contain a novel lexical occurrence, whereas the salient constituents of (12) and (13) are
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non-lexical,  it  would  be  unfair  to  imply  that  because  Lexical  Adaptation  shows  no  particular
promise in capturing (12) and (13), then it should be ruled out as a palatable explanans for the
instantiation of semantic content by “shaq”(1) and “schwoom”(11). (12) and (13) cast doubt on Lexical
Adaptation only on the premise that  its  account of the constitution of semantic content  can be
justifiably asked to apply, besides to (1), also to the properties of “peripheral” presentations such as
iconic gestures and iconic pseudowords. Granted, the pseudoword and the gesture of (12) and (13)
do fit the label “word-level sentential constituents” featuring in Dynamic L-Conventionalism. But
the parallel is problematic. While we found reasons to believe that the lexical innovations featuring
in (1) and (11) instantiate semantic content, non-lexical innovations like those observed in (12) and
(13) are bound to make a non-semantic contribution to the content of the respective sentences, since
they are impossible parts of English.
And yet, recall the toy diagnostics for the instantiation of semantic content we considered in
(7)-(10). The argument was that because “shaq”(1) satisfies the diagnostics, the novel zero-derivation
complies with Semanticity and instantiates semantic content. And since we have prior motivations
to believe that the instantiation of semantic content at the level of word-sized sentential parts has to
be grounded on a convention of lexical character, we should buy into Dynamic L-Conventionalism
and appeal to Lexical Adaptation. However, if we test (12) and (13) against the same heuristics, it
turns out that [u]-SOUND DESCENDING IN PITCH(12) and  HAND WITH PALM UP +  ARM DESCENDING
DIAGONALLY(13) satisfy it as well. Both [u]-SOUND DESCENDING IN PITCH(12) and HAND WITH PALM UP
+ ARM DESCENDING DIAGONALLY(13) do not trigger judgments of infelicity or ungrammaticality, and
seem to  interact  with  the  grammatical  structure  of  the  respective  sentences  under  the  standard
principles of compositionality. For comparison, see (14), which manages to introduce an antecedent
for modal anaphora, (15), which successfully embeds the whistle under negation, and (16), where
quantification is perfectly in order.
14) Had Bill kept allowing his mood to [iconic pseudoword: LONG DESCENDING WHISTLE],
Lucy would have left him.
15) Bill’s mood did not [iconic pseudoword: LONG DESCENDING WHISTLE]. But he wasn’t in
his best shape either.
16) Whenever  somebody  wears  Bill’s  magic  hat,  everybody  else’s  mood  [iconic
pseudoword: LONG ASCENDING WHISTLE].
In short,  if  we test  (12) and (13) against  the same criteria we relied on to argue that the zero-
derivation of  (1) instantiates semantic content, the pseudowords and the gesture of  (12) and (13)
19
turn out  to  comply with Semanticity  as well.17 However,  it  remains  antecedently clear  that  the
mechanisms whereby these constituents may be endowed with semantic content are unlikely to rely
on any prior adaptation of the body of character-level conventions of the language. (12) and (13) are
thus direct counterexamples to the thesis that the instantiation of word-level semantic content has to
presuppose the existence of an appropriate convention of character in the semantic resources of a
language. Absent this bridging posit, there is no implication between the premise that presentations
of  unattested  word-level  expressions  bear  semantic  content  and  participate  in  sentential
composition, and the idea that those features should be analyzed within a framework appealing to
the metasemantics of Lexical Adaptation.
This  is  the relevant  lesson we can learn from (12)  and (13),  and this  is  why the parallel
between (1) and the realm of onomatopoeic words, iconic pseudowords, and gestures matters to our
discussion: the “critical juncture” we mentioned earlier and identified as the cornerstone of the case
for Lexical Adaptation, is a dispensable requirement. We can, it seems, discount the principle that
word-level sentential constituents bearing full-blooded semantic content (the kind of content that
can  feed  the  compositional  matrix  of  a  linguistic  sentence)  have  to  do  so  as  a  function  of
background linguistic character; reconsider the grounds for thinking that our verdict on (1) should
not deviate dramatically from L-Conventionalism; and revisit our metasemantic assumptions based
on the independent evidence provided by cases like (12) and (13). The word-level constituents of a
sentence can instantiate semantically efficacious content even if the body of conventions available
to the language are silent, or are bound to remain silent (when the word-level parts concerned are
non-linguistic), about their standing meaning. It is not necessarily the case that either the novel
zero-derivation of (1) bears semantic content relative to an underlying update  in the character-level
conventions of the language, or leaves a semantic gap in the sentence. The comparison with (12)
and (13) paves the way for a different diagnosis: assume that (1) satisfies Semanticity, grant that
“shaq”(1) bears semantic content, and put L-Conventionalism on hold with a theory on which the
word-level constituents of a sentence can be endowed with semantic, compositionally efficacious
content without such content being the output of a function from standing linguistic meaning.
17 One might object that this conclusion is a figment of the limited battery of tests we have considered, or that a more
careful  heuristics  might  do the job of  disentangling the innovation of  (1)  from the non-linguistic  constituents
featuring in (12) and (13). However, there is growing independent consensus that iconic constituents like [u]-SOUND
DESCENDING IN PITCH(12) and  HAND WITH PALM UP +  ARM DESCENDING DIAGONALLY(13) do trigger sophisticated
semantic and compositional effects, and that they do so even on first exposure. Besides entailments, they seem to
trigger scalar implicatures,  presuppositions and associated phenomena (e.g.,  anti-presuppositions),  homogeneity
inferences characteristic of definite plurals, as well as some expressive inferences normally found in pejorative
terms. See, a.o., Abush (2012), Ebert and Ebert (2014), and Schlenker (2019).
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4. Productive Periphery
Now that  we have all  the ingredients  on the table,  we can lay out  our alternative take on the
problem. We have already anticipated the central features of the recipe, the task is now to give it a
more  orderly  formulation.  (1)  satisfies  Semanticity:  “shaq”(1) bears  semantic  content  and  the
sentence is not compositionally gappy at the position occupied by the zero-derivation, despite the
absence of an entry specifying the conventional meaning of shaqV in the lexicon of the language.
However,  the  instantiation  of  semantic  content  on  behalf  of  the  unfamiliar  presentation  is  not
grounded  on an  underlying  transition  to  an  augmented  variant  of  English  featuring  a  norm of
standing meaning for  shaqV. Instead, we should entertain the hypothesis that the instantiation of
semantic content by “shaq”(1) follows the same metasemantic blueprint suggested by presentations
of novel  onomatopoeic words  (e.g.,  “schwoom”(11)),  novel  iconic pseudowords (e.g.,  [u]-SOUND
DESCENDING IN PITCH(12)),  and  novel  pro-speech  gestures  (e.g.,  HAND WITH PALM UP +  ARM
DESCENDING DIAGONALLY(13)).
The claim is twofold. First, observation of the semantic properties instantiated by the inaugural
presentations  of  novel  iconic  constituents  gives  reason  to  withdraw  from  the  rule  that  the
instantiation  of  specialized,  semantic,  compositionally  efficacious  content  presupposes  standing
linguistic  meaning.  Second,  we can  use  this  revised  metasemantics  to  propose that  the  correct
solution  to  the  tension  between  Semanticity  and  L-Conventionalism  is  to  dispense  with  L-
Conventionalism. On the resulting view, “shaq”(1) receives compositionally efficacious content as a
result of the combined pressure of facts about the style of play of Shaquille O’Neal, facts about the
observable morphosyntactic features of the unfamiliar word, facts about sentential context, facts
about the subject matter of the conversation, and so forth. The joint normative force exerted by
these facts from the periphery of the grammar suffices to endow the novel zero-derivation with the
entire  set  of  semantic  features  the  unfamiliar  word  needs  to  comply  with  Semanticity.  Hence,
instead of Lexical Adaptation, we should have what follows.
Productive Periphery
i. The speaker produces (1) and “shaq”(1) is inaugurally presented.
ii. The presentation of (1) occurs in a situation where a set F of non-semantic facts about
“shaq”(1) holds: that the presentation exhibits a certain set of inflectional features, that it
is  derived from the name of Shaquille  O’Neal,  that  the sentence where it  occurs is
describing a basketball play, that Shaquille O’Neal is stereotypical associated with a
particular style of play, and so forth.
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iii. The facts in F generate the semantic content instantiated by “shaq”(1).
The departure from Lexical Adaptation is clear enough. On Lexical Adaptation, the presentation
of  (1)  triggers  the  transition  to  a  state  of  the  language  featuring  a  proto-convention  about  the
standing  properties  of  shaqV,  and  “shaq”(1) bears  semantic  content  relative  to  this  underlying
augmentation  of  the  specialized  semantic  resources  of  the  language.  On  the  account  I  am
encouraging to  consider,  the instantiation of  semantic-compositional  content  by “shaq”(1) is  not
mediated by any vocabulary-level middle man: it is generated directly by the combined pressure of
the set of non-semantic facts surrounding the presentation of (1). On the proposed view, the lesson
we should learn from the tension between Semanticity and L-Conventionalism created by (1) is not
that we should dynamicize L-Conventionalism (irrespective of the fact that thinking about linguistic
conventions as dynamic objects  might be independently useful and entirely correct);  rather,  we
should shift  away from L-Conventionalism and allow for a metasemantics where non-linguistic
facts can exert grammatical efficacy, and generate semantic content and compositional roles for
word-sized expressions, without the prior intervention of a function from character.
Of course,  the account is  fairly programmatic (just  as programmatic as  Lexical Adaptation
itself), and leaves important questions open. What are the specifics of the mechanisms whereby the
non-semantic  facts  surrounding  the  presentation  of  an  unfamiliar  word  can  bring  about  its
instantiation of semantic content? How exactly does the interplay of facts about Shaquille O’Neal,
facts about the morphosyntactic features of “shaq”(1), facts about the goals of the conversational
exchange, and so forth, manage to result in the determination of semantic content for “shaq”(1)?
How does Productive Periphery fit with known constraints on lexical innovation, such as lexical
contrast  (Clark  1993)  or  the  resistance  to  the  coinage  of  new  function  words?  What  is  the
relationship between everything we have said so far and the speaker’s intention in producing (1),
and, in particular, do we want speaker intentions to feature in the set of non-semantic facts that
bring about semantic content?
These are all open questions, but nothing in Productive Periphery seem to stand in the way of
giving them good answers. Suppose, for the sake of argument, we answer the last question in the
negative; intentions are an intricate business and we want to exclude them from the landscape of
facts that determine semantic content in a case like (1).18 Suppose, further, (1) is inaugurally uttered
by a speaker who is confused about Shaquille O’Neal and produces the zero-derivation with the
intention to mean a style of play Shaq never pursued in his decorated basketball career. This would
18 For the record, I am considering the possibility simply to illustrate the neutrality of Productive Periphery, not to
imply that we should go for intention-insensitivity. On intentions and conventions, see, e.g., Schiffer (2017).
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seem to lead to the problematic conclusion that speakers can be confused about the meaning of the
very lexical innovation they are coining. But I don’t think this conclusion is as problematic as it
might look at first glance. Externalist intuitions can come to the rescue. A speaker confused about
water and producing utterances of the noun waterN with the intention to refer to XYZ (or with the
belief that  waterN refers to XYZ) has no jurisdiction over the norm that utterances of  waterN in
English pick out H2O. Similarly, a speaker confused about Shaquille O’Neal uttering (1) with the
intention to refer to a style of play having nothing to do with Shaq may have no control over the
meaning that the verb is bound to instantiate given the non-semantic facts that surround it.
Similarly, consider the issue of establishing in what way Productive Periphery may do justice
to the intuition that the presentation of (1) establishes a lexical precedent that can undergo full-
fledged  conventionalization.  Again, nothing  in  the  proposed  account  makes  it  especially
problematic to  produce a story about conventionalization,  and it  is  far  from clear  that  a viable
theory of how full-fledged coordination on the conventional meaning of a new content word is
achieved within a group of speakers, should rely on the analysis of (1) given by Lexical Adaptation.
Lexical Adaptation argues that the  birth of a proto-convention of standing meaning for  shaqV is
intrinsic to the instantiation of semantic content by “shaq”(1). On Productive Periphery, the birth of
the proto-convention is not intrinsic to the instantiation of semantic content by “shaq” (1), but can
obviously occur as a result of the presentation of the novel word to the linguistic community and,
where applicable, of subsequent collective bargaining on the linguistic roles the term should play in
the language.
One last comment about the comparison between (1) and (11)-(13). I have  proposed that the
parallel with (11)-(13) suggests an argument to give up L-Conventionalism in theorizing about the
grounds of (1)’s compliance with Semanticity. It bears emphasizing that the suggestion does not,
nor is intended to, obliterate the important differences that are inevitably going to be found between
the  psychological processes  which  govern  the  interpretation  of  new  iconic  words,  iconic
pseudowords  and  pro-speech  gestures,  as  opposed  to  those  that  allow  speakers  to  interpret
“arbitrary” lexical novelties like  “shaq”(1). I am not trying to infer, from the case for a uniform
metasemantic treatment of these cases, the claim that interpretive algorithms at work in the two
domains are identical twins and wipe out the divide between iconic and arbitrary signs.19 Quite the
19 Though it might be worth mentioning that linguistic theory has been steadily shifting away from the consensus that
while iconicity can be found in spoken languages, phenomena such as onomatopoeia and sound symbolism are
“asterisks to the far more important principle of the arbitrary sign” (Pinker 1999: 2). A flurry of findings suggests
that iconic form-to-meaning mappings are much more pervasive (in signed and spoken lexicons alike) than the
dogma of arbitrariness suggests, and that elements of iconicity tend to be present, in various degrees and at various
levels  (phonemic,  prosodic,  morphological),  even  in  the  linguistic  forms  we  have  learned  to  characterize  as
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contrary: there are going to be considerable differences. The interpretation of iconic gestures relies
on an integration of information from the visual modality that  is  absent in  cases of non-iconic
lexical novelty. The same goes for pitch with the pseudoword of (12). Similarly, while pro-speech
gestures often make it possible to recover a  very fine-grained meaning, thanks to their gradient
features,  listeners  exposed to  non-iconic  lexical  innovations  are  often able  to  match the newly
encountered words with a rather coarse-grained content. Even when elements of sound symbolism
are available, as in the case of “schwoom”(11), the granularity of the meaning speakers are able to
retrieve on first exposure to the new word may be quite coarse: a fast horizontal movement possibly
producing a certain type of sound. Another difference is that while the reconstruction of the action
designated by “schwoom”(11) rests on context plus an iconic analysis of the shape of the verb, the
interpretation of “shaq”(1) requires context and a more complex plausibility inference. The listener
has to determine what properties, among those associated to Shaquille O’Neal, provide the correct
blueprint for the interpretation of the verb (physical dominance and style of play as opposed to
having an eccentric media personality).20 The proposal I am making accepts these differences, but
invites  to  consider  a  broader  point  of  potential  metasemantic  commonality  holding  across  the
spectrum of these cases:  in essence,  the ability to be invested with compositionally  efficacious
content as a result of facts sitting entirely outside the standing semantic resources of the language.
5. Conclusion
The  discussion  has  proceeded  as  follows.  Section  1  introduced  Semanticity  and  L-
Conventionalism,  and described the  tension  surfacing  when  their  combination  is  tested  against
sentences featuring lexical innovations. Section 2 presented the view that lexical innovations bear
semantic content as a result of an underlying update of the conventions of standing meaning holding
in  the  language.  Section  3  reexamined  the  case  for  the  dynamic-conventionalist  solution  and,
building on a comparison with the production of novel onomatopoeic words, iconic pseudowords
and pro-speech gestures, drew attention to the possibility of an alternative analysis of the tension.
Section  4  laid  out  the  alternative  analysis:  the  view that  the  semantic-compositional  properties
instantiated by presentations  of  unfamiliar  words motivate  a  metasemantic  allowing word-sized
“arbitrary”. See, e.g., Hinton, Nichols and Ohala (2006); Perniss, Thompson and Vigliocco (2010).
20 Besides, recall that the properties of the shape [ʃwum] are insufficient to fix any univocal meaning and that, much
like in (1), reasoning about context has to pull its weight. If the inaugural presentation of “schwoom”, instead of
occurring in (11), occurred in the sentence “The stocks were going up yesterday but today they’ll most certainly
schwoom”, the verb would be readily understood to denote something very different from the event pictured by
“schwoom”(11) (presumably, a fall instead of a swift horizontal movement). So (1) and (11) are not as distant as the
difference in iconic character might seem to suggest.
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constituents to be endowed with semantic content directly as a result of the set of non-semantic
facts surrounding the presentations at stake. The take-home message is the following: we should
consider an approach to lexical innovations that does not foresee any necessary or constitutive role
for linguistic conventions among the factors that endow inaugural presentations of unattested words
with semantic content. If this is correct, dynamic maneuvers do not help rescue L-Conventionalism
from the problem of lexical innovation.
Where does this leave us with respect to long-standing debates about the conventional nature
of linguistic meaning? I would offer two final comments. The first is about the implications of the
argument  on  the  analysis  of  “regular”  or  non-innovative  language.  Productive  Periphery  is
committed to the idea that our resolution of the tension surfacing from (1) should not aim to keep L-
Conventionalism in  the  game.  However,  the  resulting  brand of  anti-conventionalism should  be
interpreted with sufficient nuance. The suspension of L-Conventionalism encouraged by Productive
Periphery  is  in  not  necessarily  enemy  to  the  proposition  that  in  cases  involving  fully
conventionalized words, the instantiation of semantic content is successfully characterized by L-
Conventionalism,  and accordingly  that  the  principle  captures  the  “normal”  modus  operandi of
semantic content. Davidson and a line of subsequent commentators have certainly assumed that the
fate  of conventionalist  approaches  to  meaning hinged on their  ability  to  generalize to  cases of
lexical innovation. Should they fail to illuminate the interpretive dynamics in play on first exposure
to  unfamiliar  words,  the  conclusion  to  draw  would  be  that  conventionalism is  false,  and  that
linguistic  conventions  do  not  provide  explanatory  purchase  on  issues  of  semantic  content  (for
considerations in this spirit,  see Lepore and Stone 2017). I believe we should consider resisting
“totalitarian”  assumptions  of  this  sort.  For  example,  L-Conventionalism might  remain  a  sound
principle to hold for sentences and constituents built on familiar linguistic material even if none of
its  incarnations  can  hope  to  adequately  account  for  the  semantic  effects  triggered  by  lexical
innovations. Consider the following.
L-Conventionalism* The semantic content of attested word-level sentential constituents is
a function of the standing lexical conventions of the language.
Modulo a working definition of “attested”, the conjunction of L-Conventionalism* and Semanticity
seems a perfectly viable way of accounting for the semantic properties of the vast realm of everyday
linguistic production not involving the presentation of unfamiliar words.21 As long as the line we
21 Another way to put the point: proof that L-Conventionalism is universally false does not make it generically false.
If I am correct, universal interpretations of L-Conventionalism are refuted by the negative instances provided by
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seem able to draw between “standard” and “innovative” linguistic production tracks two distinct
facets or spheres of the life of a language, each responding to potentially distinct principles and
requiring potentially distinct metasemantic frameworks, we should be careful inferring, from the
difficult predicament faced by L-Conventionalism in the realm of lexical innovations, any harm to
its validity for the run-of-the-mill aspects of language it was originally designed to capture.
The  second comment is about the prospects of a “general” conventionalist approach to the
semantics of lexical innovation. As I have repeatedly made clear, my argument has been dealing
with  a  specific  incarnation  of  the  conventionalist  dogma,  and has  centered  on  the  interplay  of
semantic content and specialized linguistic conventions of semantic character. I have argued that the
rejection of L-Conventionalism is consistent with the belief in a necessary role for  non-linguistic
conventions (e.g., social conventions) in the determination of levels of linguistic meaning such as
pragmatically enriched utterance meaning. Let me conclude with noting that Productive Periphery
is  also  consistent  with  the  idea  that  non-linguistic  conventions may  be  indispensable  to  the
constitution of the zero-shot semantic content of lexical innovations themselves. As I hope to have
been able to illustrate, the issue whether L-Conventionalism is able to respond to the pressure from
lexical  innovation  is  intricate  enough  and  rich  enough  in  implications  to  warrant  autonomous
investigation. I have made my case that our verdict in  this specific regard should be Davidsonian
and anti-conventionalist. But would be improper to characterize the resulting view as the claim that
our approach to the semantics of lexical innovation should be unrestrictedly anti-conventionalist.
Productive Periphery warrants no negative stance on the claim that the presentations of unattested
words manage to instantiate semantic content only through the mediation of some suitable body of
general  non-linguistic  conventions.  Personally,  I  find  unrestricted  anti-conventionalism hard  to
swallow as a general theory of meaning, and I would be surprised if the negative verdict on L-
Conventionalism  reached  by  Productive  Periphery  triggered  a  cascade  effect  on  all  kinds  of
conventions. But that’s a topic for another occasion.
cases of lexical innovation. Nonetheless, L-Conventionalism might remain sound as a generic claim, that is, as a
claim about the factors that endow presentations of lexical expressions with semantic content in “typical” cases, and
modulo the premise that utterances of sentences built exclusively with familiar lexical material are the statistic
norm. Compare with Armstrong (2015) on “moderate explanatory conventionalism”.
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